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Abstract
The analysis of the day-by-day evolution of currency
markets often emphasises the relationship between the
behaviour of the US dollar and that of the exchange rates
between the other major currencies, in particular the tendency
of EMS currencies to appreciate vis-à-vis the DM in periods of
dollar strength. In this paper we systematically analyse this
relationship. In particular, we examine the extent to which it
has changed in the last ten years, a span of time that
included a period without realignments in the EMS, the crisis
of the System, the suspension of the lira’s participation in
the ERM and the withdrawal of the pound, the “widened” band
for the other currencies, and the re-entry of the lira. We
also suggest a possible explanation for this relationship and
find supporting empirical evidence for it: we show that the
reactions of each bilateral exchange rate to shocks to the
value of the dollar are related to the different orientation
of monetary and exchange-rate policies in the various European
countries, and that these differences are consistent with the
potential effects of variations in the exchange rates vis-à-
vis the dollar and the DM on each country’s rate of inflation.
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1. Introduction
1
The analysis of the day-by-day evolution of currency
markets often emphasises the relationship between the
behaviour of the US dollar and that of the exchange rates
between the other major currencies, in particular the tendency
of EMS currencies to appreciate vis-à-vis the DM in periods of
dollar strength.
The phenomenon is important for several reasons. On
various occasions depreciations of the dollar contributed to
tension in the ERM, a phenomenon particularly clear in the
1992 crisis. Although the widening of the EMS fluctuation band
in August 1993 has formally increased the monetary
authorities’ flexibility in defending exchange-rate parities,
it is perceived that the System could still suffer from
speculative pressures and be significantly affected by changes
in the external value of the dollar, in particular during the
period preceding the fixing of exchange rates envisaged by the
EMU process. Furthermore, the evolution of the relationship
between the behaviour of the US dollar and that of the intra-
European exchange rates may provide indications on the ability
of the EMS to insulate European exchange rates from external
shocks - one of the reasons for the creation of the System -
and indirectly on the commitment of the monetary authorities
of the various member countries to the exchange rate objective
vis-à-vis the anchor currency of the System (and the way the
markets perceive this commitment). Although the existence of
the phenomenon is unanimously agreed upon, there is no
                                                       
1 We thank Ignazio Angeloni, Pierluigi Ciocca, Luca Dedola, Eugenio
Gaiotti, Francesco Lippi, Alberto Locarno, Marco Magnani, Francesco
Papadia, Roberto Rinaldi, Morten Ravn, Daniele Terlizzese and seminar
participants  at the Bank of Italy and at the University of
Southampton for their helpful comments. We also thank Francesco
Saverio Iannetti, Luigi Infante, Giuseppe Tranchese and Claudio
Trevisan for editorial assistance. Remaining errors are of course our
own. The views expressed are the authors’ and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Bank of Italy.8
consensus on the explanation: various hypotheses have been put
forward in the literature, but none of them seems to be
completely convincing in the light of empirical tests.
In this paper we systematically analyse the
relationship between the behaviour of the US dollar and the
bilateral exchange rates of other major currencies, in
particular the European ones, vis-a-vis the DM. In particular,
we examine the extent to which this relationship has changed
in the last ten years, a span of time that included a period
without realignments in the EMS, the crisis of the System, the
suspension of the lira’s participation in the ERM and the
withdrawal of the pound, the “widened” band for the other
currencies, and the re-entry of the lira. We also suggest a
possible explanation for this relationship and find some
supporting empirical evidence for it. In particular, we show
that the reactions of each bilateral exchange rate to shocks
to the value of the dollar are related to the different
orientation of monetary and exchange-rate policies in the
various European countries, and that these differences are
consistent with the potential effects of variations in the
exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar and the DM on each
country’s rate of inflation.
In Section 2 we explain the choice of the nominal
effective US dollar exchange rate to capture the idiosyncratic
shocks to its external value.  In Section 3 we present
empirical results on the relationship between the behaviour of
the dollar and that of the other major currencies vis-à-vis
the DM. Section 4 considers the explanations put forward in
the literature for the observed empirical regularities, and
discusses their plausibility. In Section 5 we suggest an
interpretation in which these regularities are related to the
different orientation of monetary and exchange-rate policies
in the various countries. We also suggest that the different9
orientations may be the consequence of the different impact on
inflation in the countries considered of the variations in the
exchange rates vis-à-vis the two main currencies. Section 6
summarises the main conclusions of the paper.
2. Bilateral and global measures of exchange rates
The effects of fluctuations of the dollar’s external
value on the exchange rates of other currencies has been
analysed in several different ways. Considering the bilateral
exchange rate as the relevant variable,  some authors have
examined how changes in the DM-dollar exchange rate affect the
bilateral rates of the other European currencies vis-à-vis the
DM.
2 Using the bilateral DM-dollar rate, however, does not
allow one to discriminate between idiosyncratic shocks to the
dollar (caused for instance by shocks to the US economy or by
shifts in the Federal Reserve’s monetary stance) and shocks to
the DM. Since a change in the DM-dollar rate, e.g. a
depreciation of the dollar, can have very different effects on
the value of other currencies depending on whether it is
determined by a negative shock to the dollar (a depreciation
of its external value) or by a positive shock to the DM (an
appreciation), it is advisable to use a “synthetic” measure of
the value of one or the other of the two currencies, thereby
capturing their idiosyncratic shocks, and then study the
effects of its changes on the bilateral exchange rates between
other currencies.
3
The most frequently used measure of this type is the
nominal effective exchange rate, calculated by weighting the
                                                       
2 See, for example, Padoa-Schioppa (1985), Haldane and Hall (1991) and
Levy (1995).
3  Giavazzi and Giovannini (1985, 1989) and Rinaldi and Santini (1998)
use this approach; Frankel (1985b) studies the correlation between
the effective exchange rates of both the dollar and each of the other
European currencies.10
bilateral rates vis-à-vis a basket of currencies on the basis
of their relative importance in the commercial transactions of
the selected country.
4 An alternative measure can be obtained
by using a methodology based on the principal components;
however, since the results of this paper do not change
significantly between the two measures, we only present the
results obtained with the effective exchange rate.
5 We used
the effective exchange rates calculated by the Bank of Italy
on the basis of the commercial transactions with 14 main
industrial countries.
6
3. Relationship between the dollar’s behaviour and the
exchange rates of the other main currencies
In order to study the effects of shocks to the dollar
(measured by the variations of its nominal effective exchange
rate) on the exchange rates of the other currencies, we use
daily data on the following twelve currencies, in addition to
the dollar and the DM: the Dutch guilder, the Belgian franc,
the Danish krone, the French franc, the Irish punt, the
Italian lira, the Spanish peseta, the British pound, the
Swedish krone, the Swiss franc, the Japanese yen and the
Canadian dollar, and we examine four periods:
7 1 June, 1973-11
                                                       
4 The indexes compiled by the Bank of Italy and various international
organisations, including the Bank for International Settlements and
the International Monetary Fund, are of this type. Alternatively, the
weights could be based on capital transactions; the data available
for most currencies, however, do not allow this index to be
calculated for total capital flows, but only for those intermediated
by banks.
5 The synthetic measure of the dollar value which we compared with the
nominal effective exchange rate is given by the first principal
component of the log-variations of the 14 bilateral rates of the
dollar vis-à-vis the currencies which are included in the effective
exchange rate.
6  The results obtained do not change significantly excluding the
variations in the DM/dollar rate from the calculation of the
effective rate of the dollar.
7 The first two periods basically coincide with those previously
analysed by Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989).11
March, 1979 (“Monetary Snake”);
8 13 March, 1979-13 January,
1987 (EMS “with realignments”); 14 January, 1987-31 July, 1992
(EMS “without realignments”);
9 1 November, 1992-23 November,
1996 (after the ERM crisis).
10
Exchange rates are well known to be non-stationary
variables. This also applies for the nominal effective
exchange rate used in this work, as is clear from the results
reported in Tables A1-A4. We also tested the hypothesis that
the effective exchange rate of the dollar was cointegrated
with each of the bilateral exchange rates of the main European
currencies, the yen and the Canadian dollar vis-à-vis the DM;
we used the univariate method suggested by Pesaran, Shin and
Smith (1996).
11 The null hypothesis of no cointegration can be
accepted in almost all cases. In order to verify the existence
of a high frequency relationship, we ran regressions of the
bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM on the nominal
effective exchange rate of the dollar using first logarithmic
differences of the data. For each currency we estimated the
                                                       
8 Among the currencies considered, the DM, the Dutch guilder, the
French franc, the Belgian franc, the Danish krone and the Swedish
krone were members of the “Snake” during the period considered.
9 The period excludes the phase of greatest tension during the summer
which led to the crisis of the System in September 1992. Furthermore,
during this period there are discontinuities in the exchange-rate
regime for the Spanish peseta and the British pound (which joined the
ERM respectively on 19 June, 1989 and 8 October, 1990) and for the
Italian lira (which moved from the wide to the narrow band on 8
January, 1990); for these currencies we also ran regressions for the
sub-periods following these events.
10 The period excludes the sharp adjustment after the crisis of autumn
1992 and ends before the re-entry of the lira in the ERM. Regressions
estimated for a shorter sub-period (between the widening of the ERM
fluctuation band and November 1996), which can be considered more
homogeneous for the currencies that did not suspend their
participation in the System, provide similar results.
11 The Engle-Granger two-step procedure, which Pesaran, Shin and Smith
(1996) proved to be less efficient than univariate testing
procedures, gives similar results.12
following equation, using the generalised method of moments,
in the four periods considered:
12
(1) DD log( ) log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA INT tt t t =+ + + ab g e
where  DMCURt  is the DM bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the
selected currency,  EFFUSAt  is the nominal effective rate of
the dollar,  INTt are the net purchases of DMs against the
selected currency carried out by the respective central banks
and e t is a random variable with zero mean.
13
Table 1 presents the main results.
14 They show that:
- The tendency of the EMS currencies to appreciate against the
DM, although to a varying extent, when the dollar
strengthens (already noted by several authors for the 1970s
and the first part of the 1980s) is confirmed for the last
decade.
15
- As expected, between 1987 and 1992, the period of greatest
stability in the EMS, the responsiveness to dollar changes
of the bilateral rates vis-à-vis the DM was significantly
                                                       
12  The coefficients estimated coincide with those of OLS. Standard
errors are corrected for heteroschedasticity and serial correlation
up to the second order.
13 We also ran regressions including the first lag of the change in the
dollar’s effective exchange rate and the spot/next interest rate
differential between Germany and the country considered, to control
for disturbances to the bilateral exchange rate independent from the
dollar’s behaviour. It turned out that in the majority of cases these
variables are not significant. Moreover, in all cases the coefficient
of the change in the dollar’s effective exchange rate was not
significantly different from that in the original regression. This
suggests that the estimates obtained with equation (1) are quite
robust.
14  Detailed results for each regression are given in Tables A5-A8 of the
Appendix.
15 For the previous period the results substantially confirm those of
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989); minor differences may be explained by
the different time of the day in which data on exchange rates were
gathered.13
lower than in the previous EMS period, although it remained
higher for the currencies in the wide fluctuation band.
16
- Since the 1992 currency crisis, the responsiveness has risen
again for all the currencies in the EMS area, with the
exception of the Dutch guilder. The increase, however, has
not been homogeneous: it has been smaller for three of the
currencies in the narrow band whose participation to the ERM
was not interrupted (the Belgian franc, the Danish krone and
the French franc); larger for the two currencies  which
suspended their participation (the Italian lira and the
British pound) and for the Irish punt.
- The coefficient of the Swiss franc is always negative,
suggesting that it tends to depreciate against the DM when
the dollar strengthens. This is consistent with its “safe
haven” role, played in competition with the American
currency. The yen coefficient, positive in the first three
sub-periods, becomes negative in the most recent one,
possibly reflecting its increased role as a reserve
currency.
A possible objection to our analysis is that it
determines a priori the structural breaks in the relationship,
choosing the “critical” dates, rather than determining them
endogenously. This objection has been raised with regard to
previous works by Haldane and Hall (1991) and Malliaropulos
(1994), who show that in some cases changes have occurred
gradually and cannot be appropriately captured by the division
                                                       
16  The coefficients for the peseta and the pound in the sub-periods 19
June, 1989-31 July, 1992 and 8 October, 1990-31 July, 1992, after the
respective entries in the ERM, and those for the lira in the period 8
January, 1990-31 July, 1992, after the move into the narrow
fluctuation band, are reported in the footnotes of Table 1. They show
that the change in the lira’s and in the British pound’s regimes
coincided with a decrease in the strength of the relationship.14
into sub-periods. We thus completed our analysis by estimating
the following time-varying model:
(2) DD log( ) log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA INT tt t tt t t =+ + + ab g h
GG W tt t =+ - 1
where  htt Nv ~ .( ,) 0  is a random noise,  [] G ', , tt t t =a b g  and WS tt N ~ .( ,) 0 .
The system has been estimated by minimising the prediction
errors obtained by applying the Kalman filter with respect to
Wt .
Figure 1, which shows the time-varying estimate of b t ,
gives some additional information on the most recent period
and, in particular, on the effects of the lira’s re-entering
the ERM.
17 After the currency crisis in autumn 1992, only the
coefficient of the Dutch guilder remained stable (virtually at
zero); those of the other currencies of the EMS area
18
increased, especially since the second half of 1993 and,
further, since the first quarter of 1995. This suggests that
the widening of the EMS fluctuation band in August 1993 was a
regime change for the currencies involved. The coefficients of
all these currencies fell again during 1996 and during the
early months of 1997. The sharp reduction of the lira’s
coefficient in 1997 may have partly resulted from the lira’s
re-entering the ERM in the second half of November.
                                                       
17 The charts report the results only for the 1987-1997 period. For the
preceding years the analysis confirms that in the countries which
adhered to the EMS from the beginning the coefficient started to
decrease well in advance of the inception of the System, in most
cases recording a large part of the reduction during 1978. This
suggests that the marked anticipated the effects of the new regime
or, as suggested by Malliaropulos (1994), that the change in the
relationship reflected the process of financial integration and
monetary policy convergence more than the institutional change per
se. After the decline, the coefficients stabilised in the first half
of the 1980s.
18  We define this area as comprising the ERM currencies, including the
Italian lira, the British pound, and the Swedish krone.15
So far we have measured the effects of the dollar’s variations
on the bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM. Monetary
authorities, however, could be interested in the effective
exchange rates of their respective currencies as a global
measure of their external value, rather than in the bilateral
exchange rates. Thus, we also ran regressions of the daily
percentage changes of the effective exchange rates of the
selected currencies on changes in the dollar effective rate
(the results are given in Table 2
19). The estimated
coefficients reflect both the reaction of the bilateral rates
and their different weights in the effective exchange rate of
each country, providing information complementary to that
obtained above. In particular, we can observe that, as for the
bilateral rates, the reactions of the effective exchange rates
to the dollar shocks differ significantly across EMS
currencies. The differences concern not only the size but also
the sign, as the differing effect on the bilateral exchange
rates vis-à-vis the DM is amplified by the large weight of
this currency in the effective exchange rates of the European
currencies. The effective rates of the Dutch guilder, the
Belgian franc, the Danish krone and the French franc all tend
to fall, on average, in periods of dollar strengthening, over
the entire sample period considered. Those of the lira and the
pound, on the contrary, tend to appreciate in all the sub-
periods with the exception of 1987-1992. Those of the punt and
the peseta tend to appreciate in the periods preceding their
respective entries in the ERM, vice versa in the following
periods.
4. Two explanations proposed in the literature
The existence of a systematic relationship between the
dollar and the exchange rates between the European currencies
                                                       
19  Detailed results for each regression are reported in Tables A9-A12.16
implies that a shock which is expected to determine a dollar
variation, e.g. an increase in US interest rates, induces
investors to sell assets denominated in marks more than assets
denominated in other European currencies, in order to buy
assets denominated in dollars. The explanations of this
empirical regularity put forward in the literature concentrate
on two main aspects: the degree of substitutability between
assets denominated in different currencies, reflecting the
correlation between their expected yields, and the
segmentation and different depths of the markets for the
various currencies, in particular owing to capital controls.
The first aspect has been analysed by Giavazzi and
Giovannini (1985) and Frankel (1985a, 1985b) within the
theoretical framework of capital asset pricing models. These
authors test the explanatory power of the International
Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) for the relationship
between the external value of the dollar and the exchange rate
of other currencies vis-à-vis the DM. According to this class
of models, the different degree of substitutability
20 between
assets denominated in different currencies is a function of
the covariance between the expected yields of the financial
assets in the market, under the hypothesis that investors
maximise a static function of the mean and the variance of the
expected yield of their portfolio.
21 Table 3 reports the
correlation between the real yield differentials
22 (including
the change in the exchange rate) of assets denominated in the
main European currencies, in yen and in Canadian dollars and
                                                       
20 We define two assets as highly substitutable if their yields are
highly correlated, so that holding both assets does not allow the
investment risk to be diversified; in this case small changes in
expected yields determine, ceteris paribus, large movements of
capital from one asset to the other.
21  See, for instance, Dornbusch (1983).
22  Similar results are obtained for nominal differentials.17
those denominated in US dollars, calculated for the same
periods as considered in Section 3. The results, although not
directly comparable with those obtained by the authors
mentioned above, confirm their conclusions for the last
decade: in the two periods between January 14, 1987 and July
31, 1992 and between November 1, 1992 and November 23, 1996
the sample correlation between the yields on dollar assets and
those in DM (and thus their substitutability) is generally
lower than between the former and assets denominated in other
European currencies.
23 The total value of assets denominated
in DM that should be sold to buy assets denominated in dollars
when the latter strengthens is thus smaller than that of
assets denominated in other European currencies. These
currencies should therefore depreciate vis-à-vis the DM,
rather than appreciate, the opposite of what we observed in
Section 3.
In the ICAPM the equilibrium exchange rate is a
function of the expected yields of the assets available in the
market, which in the model are exogenously given.
Alternatively, Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) also tried to
use a model where yields are endogenously determined and the
equilibrium exchange rate depends on the money supply, on the
production level and on the average intertemporal rate of
substitution of consumption in each country (Lucas, 1982). The
empirical test presented by the authors shows that this model
is also unable to explain the empirical regularity described
in Section 3.
The second explanation proposed in the literature
focuses on the segmentation and the different depth of the
                                                       
23  The correlation is in fact negative both between the dollar and the
DM yields and between the former and the yields of the other European
currencies; in the first case it is larger in absolute value. These
results should be interpreted with caution, given the high
sensitivity of the coefficients to the choice of the estimation
period.18
markets for the various currencies. In particular, Giavazzi
and Giovannini (1989) suggested that, owing to the existence
of capital controls, currency markets in France, Italy, Spain
and, until the end of the 1970s, the United Kingdom, were
thinner. As a consequence, assets denominated in the
currencies of these countries were less substitutable with
those denominated in dollars than assets denominated in DM,
independently of the correlation between their yields. This
explanation, however, cannot be applied to the recent period,
as capital controls had been eliminated in all the European
markets by the end of the 1980s. Nor does it seem plausible
that the observed relationships reflect the markets’ fear that
capital controls might be re-introduced (a possibility that
even in the 1992-93 crisis occurred only in Ireland and in
Spain, exclusively for some types of financial transactions
and for a limited period).
Another possibility is that factors other than capital
controls - such as differing costs of acquiring information on
the evolution of variables affecting different currencies
24 -
determine the markets’ depth, which in turn concurs in
explaining the observed empirical regularity.
25 To verify this
hypothesis, albeit indirectly, Table 4 presents the amounts of
dollar transactions vis-à-vis other currencies on the main
markets, both in absolute terms and as a ratio to the stock of
international assets denominated in the selected currencies.
These data, which can be interpreted as a proxy of the various
market depths, only partially support the above hypothesis:
the share of the transactions against DM is larger than those
of transactions against the other European currencies (the
ratio of spot transactions to the stock of international
assets is 6.3 per cent for the DM, compared with between 1.3
                                                       
24  See, for instance, Mayshar (1983).
25 An explanation of this type is mentioned in BIS (1996a).19
and 4.1 for the other major European currencies
26), but the
ranking of the latter on the basis of this measure does not
correspond to the ranking of the coefficients estimated in
Section 3. As shown by the four quadrants in Figure 2 (based
on spot transactions) there are both currencies with a
relatively thin market and a low coefficient (the Dutch
guilder, the Belgian franc, the Danish krone and the French
franc) and currencies with a thin market and a high
coefficient (the Italian lira, the Spanish peseta and the
Swedish krone). Moreover, the British pound’s market is deep
but its coefficient is high.
These observations suggest that the depth of the market
may have a partial role in determining a different
substitutability between assets denominated in different
currencies: it may in fact help to explain the relationship
between the DM and the other European currencies as a whole,
but not the large differences observed across the latter.
5. Another explanation: a role for monetary policies and
exchange-rate targets
The differences observed in Section 3 in the reactions
of bilateral exchange rates to the dollar changes - both
across currencies and across periods - suggest that the
different orientation of monetary and exchange-rate policies
over time and between countries may be an important factor
underlying the observed relationship, together with the
different ways in which policies are perceived and anticipated
by the markets. Changes over time affect all the EMS
currencies in the same way: as seen in Section 3, they all
tend to appreciate against the DM when the dollar strengthens
and the intensity of this effect diminishes for all of them
                                                       
26 The higher values of the ratio observed for the Scandinavian
currencies reflect the small stock of assets denominated in these
currencies.20
when the exchange-rate regime becomes more stringent. Here we
concentrate on cross-country differences, which are large and
persistent over time (the ranking of the effects of the dollar
shock on the various currencies is constant across the various
sub-periods).
In checking whether the ICAPM model is capable of
explaining the reactions of bilateral exchange rates with
respect to the DM to dollar changes, it has been assumed that
the shock to the dollar has no effects on the yields of
investments denominated in other currencies; any change in the
composition of investors’ portfolios is thus made dependent on
the change of the revenues on dollar assets. However, if we
assumed that a shock to the dollar could induce a change in
the monetary policy stance of the other countries, then the
reallocation of investors’ portfolio would also depend on the
effects of these changes on the yields of assets denominated
in the respective currencies. The relationship between the
value of the dollar and the bilateral exchange rates between
the European currencies could therefore depend on the
different reaction function of each country’s monetary
authority.
Assume, for instance, that interest rates are fixed by
central banks which also react to the bilateral exchange rates
vis-à-vis the dollar and the DM. In this case a positive shock
to the dollar determines a larger interest-rate increase in
countries where the central bank puts more weight on the
bilateral rate vis-à-vis this currency; if the reaction is
larger than in Germany, the interest rate differential between
these countries and Germany widens, determining an
appreciation of the respective currencies vis-à-vis the DM.
This effect can be captured by a simple three-country
model. Consider the following interest rate parities between
the dollar, the DM and a third currency, allowing for21
deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity due to
exogenous factors that can be attributed to any currency:
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/$ is the expected log-variation between t and t+1 of
the exchange rate of the third currency vis-à-vis the dollar;
() Et .  is the expectation operator based on information
available at time t; it
USA  is the interest rate on assets
denominated in dollars; e t
$ captures any positive idiosyncratic
shock affecting the value of the dollar in a way that alters
the interest rate parity; the variables for the other two
currencies are defined analogously. Moreover, assume that the
central bank of the third country fixes the policy interest
rate taking into account, among other things, the level of the
bilateral exchange rate both vis-à-vis the DM and the dollar,
and that the market interest rate is a function of the policy
rate, thus reacting to a change in the exchange rate according
to the following reaction function:
27
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CUR is a parameter capturing other variables affecting
the interest rates. Finally, assume that the German
authorities have no target for the bilateral exchange rates.
28
                                                       
27  A similar reaction function has been assumed by McCallum (1994) in a
two-country model.
28  The implications of the model do not change under the hypothesis that
the reaction of the German authorities is not necessarily null, but
lower than those of the third country considered. This hypothesis is
consistent with the idea that the US and German policies are the two22
Totally differentiating equations (4) and (6), substituting
one into the other and substituting for dst
DM $/  using equation





DM /$ / $/ =- , we obtain the
following expression for a change of the exchange rate of the
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where  f$
'  is the partial derivative of the  f  function with
respect to its second argument and the other two derivatives
are defined analogously. Rewriting equation (7) at time t+1
and applying the expectation operator based on information
available at time t to both sides of this expression and
iterating the substitution, we obtain an expression where the
exchange rate of the third currency vis-à-vis the DM is a
function of the expectations on the bilateral exchange rates
of the same currency and the dollar vis-à-vis the DM and of
the expectations on interest rates in Germany and in the US:
(8)   () ds
ff
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“poles of attraction” for the policies of other countries and that
the latter tend to settle in an intermediate position. This seems a
sensible hypothesis and is actually supported by the empirical
evidence on the correlation between the policy rates of the various
countries.23
where T>t is a generic future period. From this relationship,
assuming  () Ed s t tT
CUR DM
+ =
/ 0 (i.e. that the long-term expectations on
the exchange rate of the third currency vis-à-vis the DM do
not change), it appears that an idiosyncratic shock on the
external value of the dollar determines, for  f$
' > 0, an



























where the first equality reflects equation (5). This result
indicates that the variation of the bilateral exchange rates
vis-à-vis the DM triggered by a shock to the dollar varies
depending on the relative size of  f$
'  and  fDM
' , that is on the
relative weights assigned to the two main currencies in the
exchange rate policy of each country.
The same model could be applied to other third
currencies. In this case we would obtain variations of the
respective exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM which depend on the
relative size of the parameters  f$
'  and  fDM
'  for each of them.
From this model it is thus possible to obtain a ranking of the
reactions of the exchange rates of the European currencies
vis-à-vis the DM after a shock to the external value of the
dollar comparable to that implicit in the results of Section
3.
Furthermore, equation (8) shows that the reaction of
the bilateral exchange rate of the third currency against the
DM in the case of a dollar shock also depends on the
expectations about the evolution of the DM/dollar exchange
rate and of each country’s interest rates (the term in the
sum). For instance, if the markets interpreted an increase of
US interest rates as part of a monetary tightening that was24
expected to continue, the third currency’s appreciation
against the DM at time t would be bigger than indicated by
equation (9).
According to the implications of the model, we should
expect a cross-country relationship between the coefficients
estimated in Section 3, which measure the effect of dollar
shocks on the bilateral rates vis-à-vis the DM, and indexes of
the relative position of the national exchange rate and
monetary policy between the two poles of attraction provided
by Germany and US.
The most direct way to test this would be to estimate  f$
'  and
fDM
' . This is a difficult task, however, as the move of the
monetary authorities may reflect important factors other than
the variations of the two exchange rates.
29 Alternatively, the
implications of the model can be tested by examining the
relationship between each country’s interest rate and the
German and American ones. In fact substituting equation (8)
and the equivalent expression for dst
CUR/$ into the expression
for dit
CUR obtained by totally differentiating equation (6), we
obtain a relationship between the interest rates of the third
country and those in the US and in Germany:
                                                       
29  In fact, we were able to detect a statistically significant reaction
to the variation of the bilateral rate vis-à-vis the DM, while in
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Equation (10) shows that the partial correlation
between the third country’s interest rate and the American one
coincides with the reaction to a dollar shock of the bilateral
exchange rate vis-à-vis the DM, shown in equation (9).
Moreover, the partial correlation with the German interest
rate also reflects the relative weights of the currency in the


































In order to test the implications of equation (10) of
our model we have estimated, using daily data, the partial
correlations between the one-month euro-market interest rates
of each of the countries considered and those of Germany and
the US. To avoid the problems of spurious regressions, we have
corrected for first order autocorrelation of the error term as
suggested by Blough (1992) and Hamilton (1994). We first
examine the correlation with the US rate only (captured by
equation (11)), which is more directly related to the
empirical analysis of Section 3 (as can be seen by comparing
equations (8) and (11)). Coherently with the prediction of our
theoretical analysis, Figure 3 shows the existence of a26
positive relationship, in a pooled sample of the two sub-
periods 1987-1992 and 1992-1996, between the estimated
correlations between each country’s rate and the US rate and
the corresponding b s from regression (1). If the reaction of
the bilateral exchange rates vis-a-vis the DM to a dollar
shock had not been a function of actual or expected monetary
policy actions, but depended on a correlation between shocks
to the dollar and shocks to the DM (namely if  () Cor t
DM
t ee ,
$ ¹ 0 ),
we would not have found a relationship between the reaction
coefficients and the partial correlation of the interest
rates.
However, the relationship is not very strong; this
could be due to the role of the other factors affecting the
choice of the policy interest rates by the central banks
(which we have included in the variable h  of equation (6))
and to the unequal transmission of changes in policy rates
into markets rates in the various countries. To overcome this
second problem, we have estimated, using end-of-the week data,
the partial correlations between the policy interest rates of
each of the countries considered and those of Germany and the
US.
30 As is clear from Figure 4, in this case the relationship
of the partial correlations between each country’s interest
rates and those of the US with the b s is more clearly
defined.
                                                       
30  The correlations are calculated with respect to the mean of the
discount rate and the Lombard rate for Germany and with respect to
the target for the Fed funds rate for the US. The policy rates used
for the other countries are the following: the central rate for
Belgium, the rate on banks’ current account deposits with the central
bank for Denmark; the repo rate for Italy; the overnight rate for
France; the rate on special loans for the Netherlands, the auction
rate for Spain, the base rate for the UK, and the Riksbank lending
rate for Sweden. In the case of Belgium we had to tackle
discontinuities in the series. Data are from the BIS data base, with
the exception of the target for the Fed funds rate, which is from
Rudebusch (1995).27
Although the test just used is the most consistent with
our model, it may be worth considering another which takes
into account an important factor, not explicitly captured by
the model, i.e. the asymmetric position of the EMS currencies
between the two poles of attraction. As mentioned earlier, the
reaction of the national monetary policies to the variation of
the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the DM is more easy to
detect statistically. This is not surprising as almost all the
countries considered in the test were members of an exchange
rate regime centred on the DM, although they interpreted the
relationship more or less rigidly. These results suggest that
considering the relationship with the German interest rate as
well (captured in the model by equation (12)) is likely to
improve the explanatory content of the variable considered.
Figure 5 shows that when consideration is given to the
difference between the correlation of each country’s policy
rates with both the American and the German ones, this is
indeed the case: the relationship with the corresponding b s
from regression (1) is stronger than that shown in Figure 4.
On the whole, Figures 3 to 5 suggest that the
differences in the exchange-rate and monetary policies play an
important role in explaining the differences in the estimated
b s: the less a country’s monetary policy aims at maintaining
a strict exchange-rate target vis-à-vis the DM, or the less
close is the link with German monetary policy (or the closer
that with the American one), the stronger is the reaction to a
dollar shock of the bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the
DM.
31
                                                       
31  A similar result is obtained by BIS (1997), where it is also shown
that the differences in the estimated  b s are correlated with measures
of trade links, the comovement of cyclical fluctuations and the
international use of the currency.28
From these results it is clear that the monetary
authorities of the various countries behave differently. This
could reflect different monetary policy objectives or perhaps
different ways of pursuing the same objective. Indeed, in
particular for the period following the 1992 currency crisis,
it seems reasonable to hypothesise that an inflation target
was the main reference for the monetary authorities of the EMS
area, independently of whether intermediate targets were also
maintained. If this is the case, it is likely that each
country reacted differently to changes in the value of its
currency vis-à-vis the dollar and the DM depending on the
relative inflationary effects of the changes.
A possible test of this hypothesis could be based on
the composition of trade flows by currency of denomination, in
particular dollars and marks. This information, however, is
available only for some of the countries considered. Moreover,
the use of such data can be misleading when prices are fixed
in one currency and settlements are made in a different one or
when there are pricing-to-market phenomena, absorbing part of
the exchange-rate variations. One possible proxy of the effect
of the variations of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar on
the respective countries’ inflation is provided by measures of
their dependence on imports of raw materials, in particular
energy. However, the relationship between the behaviour of the
monetary authorities and this measure, although suggesting
that this variable may have an explanatory content, was not
significant for the countries considered taken as a whole.
32
                                                       
32 The results, not presented here, suggest that there is a link between
the behaviour of the monetary authorities of most of the European
countries considered and their dependence on energy imports; on the
whole, however, the relationship is very weak owing to the presence
of two outliers: the UK, which has a high  b  coefficient although it
is a net exporter of energy materials, and Belgium, whose monetary
policy does not seem to reflect the possible inflationary effects
resulting from a high dependence on energy imports. Even weaker
results are obtained considering the net imports of total raw
materials (this may be explained by the fact that for some non-energy29
We therefore preferred to run simulations with the NIESR
Global econometric model (GEM):
33 we observed deviations from
the baseline of the consumption deflator in response to a
permanent 10 per cent appreciation of the DM (or the dollar)
vis-à-vis all the other currencies; the deviations are
measured in the period of the shock (with the exception of
Spain, where a significant effect shows up only in the second
quarter of the simulation) and in the last quarter of the
simulation horizon (80 periods after the shock). This allowed
us to determine two measures of the relative inflationary
effects of changes in the value of the two main currencies:
the ratio of the impact effect on the inflation rate of each
country of a DM shock to that of a dollar shock and the same
ratio for the long-run effect. The upper part of Figure 6
shows the relationship between the impact ratio and the index
of the relative correlation between each country’s monetary
policy and the German and US ones. The lower part of the
figure shows the same relationship for the long run-effect.
The results seem consistent with the hypothesis that the
monetary authorities’ behaviour reflects the expected
inflationary effects of exchange-rates variations.
34 The
attention paid to the DM has been in fact lower in countries
where the dollar has a relatively bigger effect on inflation,
possibly reflecting the above-mentioned factors related to the
composition of trade flows.
                                                                                                                                                                          
goods the markets are likely to be less efficient and the payments
are not necessarily made in dollars).
33  GEM is the quarterly model of the world economy of the National
Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR, 1997); it has been
used in various research papers and is used regularly by the NIESR to
prepare forecasts for the world economy.
34  The results, however, should be interpreted with caution, as the
observed relationship is not confirmed for all the intermediate
horizons of the simulations.30
6. Conclusions
Our empirical analysis shows that the relationship
between the dollar and the bilateral exchange rates of a group
of major currencies - in particular the tendency of the EMS
currencies to appreciate vis-à-vis the DM when the dollar
strengthens - is confirmed for the last decade. The
responsiveness of the EMS currencies to changes in the
dollar’s value varies significantly, however, both across
countries and across periods. After decreasing in the 1987-
1992 period, it rose again after the currency crisis, to a
larger extent for the lira, the pound and the punt. The effect
appears to have diminished during 1996, possibly reflecting
the progressive convergence of the European economic policies
and the expectations on the unification process, as well as
Italy’s re-entering the ERM in the case of the lira.
The explanations put forward in the literature, which
are based on the degree of substitutability between assets
denominated in the various currencies (related to the
correlation between their expected yields or to the presence
of capital controls), are not supported by the empirical
evidence. The different depth of the markets for the various
currencies may have a partial role, and help to explain the
behaviour of the European currencies as a whole vis-à-vis the
DM, but not the remarkable differences between them.
This paper suggests an alternative explanation,
consisting in the orientation of monetary and exchange-rate
policies in the various countries, or in the different ways
they are perceived and anticipated by the markets. This
explanation is supported by the existence of a significant
relationship between the estimated effects of dollar shocks on
the bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM and the link
between the monetary policies in the respective countries and
the American and German ones. It is also consistent with the31
hypothesis that in the period considered all the monetary
authorities of the EMS area pursued an anti-inflationary
strategy, and that in doing so they took into account the
different effects of changes in the value of the DM and the
dollar on domestic inflation.Table 1
EFFECTS OF VARIATIONS IN THE NOMINAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE DOLLAR
ON THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES VIS-À-VIS THE DEUTSCHEMARK
(regression coefficients of the log-differences and standard errors
1)







































































































































































































                    
1 GMM estimates. The asterisk indicates that the coefficient is not statistically different from zero at a
significance level of 95%.
2 For the period 8.1.1990-31.7.1992, after the lira’s move to the narrow band, the coefficient is equal  to
0.11 (0.014).
3 For the period 9.6.1989-31.7.1992, after the peseta’s entry in the ERM, the coefficient is equal  to 0.10
(0.016).
4 For the period 8.10.1990-31.7.1992, after the pound’s entry in the ERM, the coefficient is equal  to 0.18
(0.036).Table 2
EFFECTS OF VARIATIONS IN THE NOMINAL EFFECTIVE RATE OF THE DOLLAR ON OTHER CURRENCIES’
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
(regression coefficients of the log-differences and standard errors
5)







































































































































































































                    
5 GMM estimates. The asterisk indicates that the coefficient is not statistically different from zero at a
significance level of 95%.
6 For the period  1.8.1990-7.31.1992, after the lira’s  move to the narrow band, the coefficient is equal  to
-0.06 (0.015).
7 For the period 6.9.1989-7.31.1992, after the peseta’s entry in the ERM, the coefficient is equal  to -0.14
(0.016).
8 For the period 10.8.1990-7.31.1992, after the pound’s entry in the ERM, the coefficient is equal  to -0.17
(0.037).Table 3
CORRELATION VIS-À-VIS US INTEREST RATES,









Germany -0.50 -0.65 -0.59
Netherlands -0.48 -0.65 -0.60
Belgium -0.49 -0.63 -0.57
Denmark -0.48 -0.62 -0.50
French -0.47 -0.62 -0.47
Ireland -0.64 -0.02
Italy -0.34 -0.56  0.19
Spain -0.57 -0.18
United Kingdom -0.19 -0.59  0.04
Sweden -0.00 -0.46  0.07
Swiss -0.51 -0.61 -0.63
Japan -0.46 -0.59 -0.65
Canada  0.83  0.84  0.73
                                                       
1 Includes the monthly realised variation of the exchange rate vis-à-
vis the dollar. Nominal interest rates have been deflationed using
a unique index obtained by weighting the inflation  rates of each
country considered on the basis of the average proportions in the
1980-1994 period. All values are different from zero at the 95 per
cent significance level, with the exception of those for Sweden in
the first period and for the UK and Ireland in the third one.Table 4
TRANSACTIONS VIS-À-VIS THE DOLLAR









































































US market (2) 34.7 9.2 5.8 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 8.1 23.1 4.6 7.2 100.0




6.3 4.1 1.3 1.6 3.6 2.0 9.1 1.2 - 15.6 0.5 3.2 5.1 0.6 - -
Sources: BIS; Bank of England; Federal Reserve of New York.
(1)Data in Italics are estimated on the basis of those directly available from the surveys.
(2)For the total of international markets and for the London market the first row reports spot transactions; the second
row total transactions (sum of spot, outright forward and foreign exchange swap transactions); data for the US market
refer to total transactions. All data are adjusted to avoid double counting.
(3)Data are based on spot transactions on the total of international markets, surveyed by the BIS; international assets
are the sum of the following items, also of BIS source: banks’ cross-border positions, euronotes and international
bonds.Figure 2
EFFECTS OF DOLLAR VARIATIONS ON BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST THE DM (b bS)













00 . 1 0 . 2
ratio of dollar transactions for each currency to those for the DM
b
(1) On the vertical axis effects of the dollar variations estimated in the period
November 1992-November 1996 (see Table 1); on the horizontal axis ratios of spot
transactions against dollars for the respective currencies to those for the DM
(data are partly estimated; see footnote 1 of Table 4).Figure 3
EFFECTS OF DOLLAR VARIATIONS ON BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST THE DM (b bS)
VIS-À-VIS CORRELATION BETWEEN EACH COUNTRY’S EURO-MARKET INTEREST RATES
AND THE US ONES (1)
Pooled sample
























-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
correlations between each country's euro-market interest rates and the US ones
b
(1) The effects of dollar variations are those estimated in Section 3; interest
rates coefficients are partial correlations obtained regressing the one month
euro-market interest rates of each of the countries considered on the German and
US ones, correcting for autocorrelation of the error term in order to avoid
problems of spurious regressions as suggested by Blough (1992) and Hamilton
(1994). Numbers 1 or 2 added to the country code refer to the subsample
considered.Figure 4
EFFECTS OF DOLLAR VARIATIONS ON BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST THE DM (b bS)
VIS-À-VIS CORRELATION BETWEEN EACH COUNTRY’S POLICY RATES AND THE US ONE (1)
Pooled sample



























-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
correlations between each country's policy rates and US ones
b
(1) The effects of dollar variations are those estimated in Section 3; monetary policy
reactions are partial correlations obtained regressing the selected policy rates
for the various countries on the German and US one, correcting for autocorrelation
of the error term in order to avoid problems of spurious regressions as suggested
by Blough (1992) and Hamilton (1994); policy rates are those reported in footnote
29. Numbers 1 or 2 added to the country code refer to the subsample considered.Figure 5
EFFECTS OF DOLLAR VARIATIONS ON BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST THE DM (b bS)
VIS-À-VIS RELATIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN EACH COUNTRY’S POLICY RATES
AND THE US AND GERMAN ONES (1)
Pooled sample



























-0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
index of the relative correlations of each country's policy rates with US and German ones
b
(1) The effects of dollar variations are those estimated in Section 3; the index of
monetary policy reactions is the difference of the partial correlations obtained
regressing the selected policy rates for the various countries on the Us and German
ones, correcting for autocorrelation of the error term in order to avoid problems
of spurious regressions as suggested by Blough (1992) and Hamilton (1994); policy
rates are those reported in footnote 29. Numbers 1 or 2 added to the country code
refer to the subsample considered.Figure 6
CORRELATION BETWEEN EACH COUNTRY’S POLICY RATES AND THE US AND GERMAN ONES
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ratio of the effect on each country's inflation of a variation in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the DM 
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ratio of the effect on each country's inflation of the variation in the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the DM 



































































































(1) The indices of the monetary policy reaction are those of Figure 5; the inflationary
effects of dollar and DM variations are estimated with the NIESR Global econometric
model, as described in Section 5.Table A1
STATIONARITY AND COINTEGRATION TESTS FOR THE PERIOD 1.6.1973-11.3.1979 (1)






















exchange rate of the
US dollar
(4)
US Dollar -0.572 -0.204
Dutch Guilder
-1.029 -2.026 2.838 -1.8749
Belgian Franc
-0.249 -3.092 3.784 -1.4807
Danish Krone
-2.225 -0.806 0.544 -2.9877
French Franc
-1.500 -1.164 0.733 -2.0020
Irish Punt
-1.848 -1.678 1.940 -0.8402
Italian Lira
-0.743 -0.901 0.514 -2.1202
Spanish Peseta
-0.631 -0.510 1.806 -2.1629
British Pound
-1.840 -1.678 1.937 -0.9005
Sweden Krone
-0.160  0.196 0.763 -3.7270
Swiss Franc
-0.325 -0.867 0.925 -1.2728
 Japanese Yen
 0.533 -2.124 1.911 -0.1434
Canadian Dollar
 1.294  0.488 0.286 -3.0809
(1) The null hypothesis can never be rejected at the 5% level.
(2) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test based on OLS F Statistic; H0 :a=0, r=1in regression  yy tt t =+ + - ar e 1 .
(3) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residual of the  following OLS  regression:  () log log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA tt i t =+ + - ae .
(4) Pesaran,  Shin and Smith (1996) test based on OLS F Statistic; H0: fr == 0 in regression:
DD D log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA DMCUR INT DMCUR EFFUSA ti t i
i
it i t t tt t
i
=+ + + + + + -
=
-- -






STATIONARITY AND COINTEGRATION TESTS FOR THE PERIOD 21.3.1979-31.1.1987 (1)






















exchange rate of the
US dollar
(4)
US Dollar -1.209 -1.015
Dutch Guilder
 1.063 -2.201 3.284 -0.5336
Belgian Franc
-1.697 -1.127 0.855 -2.4617
Danish Krone
-3.308 -2.584 2.639 -2.5769
French Franc
-1.292 -0.431 0.012 -1.5908
Irish Punt
-2.130  0.595 2.315 -2.2551
Italian Lira
-1.711 -0.582 1.388 -1.4464
Spanish Peseta
-1.076 -0.372 0.447 -1.2461
British Pound
-0.337  0.366 0.541 -1.7461
Sweden Krone
-0.688 -0.225 1.153 -1.6958
Swiss Franc
-0.399 -1.627 2.295 -1.5955
 Japanese Yen
-0.204 -0.902 0.568 -1.4977
Canadian Dollar
-0.345 -0.515 0.965 -2.1035
(1) The null hypothesis can never be rejected at the 5% level.
(2) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test based on OLS F Statistic; H0 :a=0, r=1in regression  yy tt t =+ + - ar e 1 .
(3) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residual of the  following OLS  regression:  () log log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA tt i t =+ + - ae .
(4) Pesaran,  Shin and Smith (1996) test based on OLS F Statistic; H0: fr == 0 in regression:
DD D log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA DMCUR INT DMCUR EFFUSA ti t i
i
it i t t tt t
i
=+ + + + + + -
=
-- -






STATIONARITY AND COINTEGRATION TESTS FOR THE PERIOD 14.1.1987-31.7.1992 (1)






















exchange rate of the
US dollar
(4)
US Dollar -2.183 -1.377
Dutch Guilder
-1.017 -3.119 5.370* -2.0024
Belgian Franc
-0.592 -2.252 3.319 -2.3590
Danish Krone
-0.953 -2.069 2.136 -1.6588
French Franc
-0.618 -2.416 3.157 -13296
Irish Punt
-0.922 -3.569 7.837* -2.1932
Italian Lira
-2.702 -2.075 4.242 -2.5685
Spanish Peseta
-1.457 -2.044 3.226 -2.0146
British Pound
-2.705 -1.765 2.075 -3.1676
Sweden Krone
-2.540 -1.447 1.982 -3.1443
Swiss Franc
-1.682 -1.343 2.425 -1.8529
 Japanese Yen
-1.371 -1.157 0.859 -1.6271
Canadian Dollar
-2.057 -1.530 4.163 -1.2610
(1) An asterisk indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level.
(2) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test based on OLS F Statistic; H0 :a=0, r=1in regression  yy tt t =+ + - ar e 1 .
(3) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residual of the  following OLS  regression:  () log log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA tt i t =+ + - ae .
(4) Pesaran,  Shin and Smith (1996) test based on OLS F Statistic; H0: fr == 0 in regression:
DD D log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA DMCUR INT DMCUR EFFUSA ti t i
i
it i t t tt t
i
=+ + + + + + -
=
-- -






STATIONARITY AND COINTEGRATION TESTS FOR THE PERIOD 1.11.1992-23.11.1996 (1)






















exchange rate of the
US dollar
(4)
US Dollar -1.702 -1.429
Dutch Guilder
-1.462 -3.067 8.096* -2.5134
Belgian Franc
-1.209 -1.917 20.792* -2.2694
Danish Krone
-1.365 -2.040 2.907 -2.1833
French Franc
-1.669 -2.385 4.659* -2.6982
Irish Punt
-2.844 -2.606 5.111* -3.2001
Italian Lira
-2.769 -2.440 4.632* -3.7559
Spanish Peseta
-2.423 -2.373 2.458 -2.0219
British Pound
-1.518 -1.291 3.175 -1.8305
Sweden Krone
-4.105 -4.176 2.402 -5.4320*
Swiss Franc
-1.383 -1.455 1.661 -1.9751
 Japanese Yen
-2.189 -1.786 1.930 -3.2222
Canadian Dollar
-2.166 -1.441 1.471 -2.4591
(1) An asterisk indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level.
(2) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test based on OLS F Statistic; H0 :a=0, r=1in regression  yy tt t =+ + - ar e 1 .
(3) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residual of the  following OLS  regression:  () log log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA tt i t =+ + - ae .
(4) Pesaran,  Shin and Smith (1996) test based on OLS F Statistic; H0: fr == 0 in regression:
DD D log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) DMCUR EFFUSA DMCUR INT DMCUR EFFUSA ti t i
i
it i t t tt t
i
=+ + + + + + -
=
-- -






RESULTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE REGRESSION OF BILATERAL
EXCHANGE RATES VIS-À-VIS THE DM ON THE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE
RATE OF THE DOLLAR FOR THE PERIOD 1.6.1973-11.3.1979 (1)
























































































(1) GMM estimates; the numbers in parenthesis are Student’s t.Table A6
RESULTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE REGRESSION OF BILATERAL
EXCHANGE RATES VIS-À-VIS THE DM ON THE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE
OF THE DOLLAR FOR THE PERIOD 12.3.1979-13.1.1987 (1)
























































































(1) GMM estimates; the numbers in parenthesis are Student’s t.Table A7
RESULTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE REGRESSION OF BILATERAL
EXCHANGE RATES VIS-À-VIS THE DM ON THE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE
OF THE DOLLAR FOR THE PERIOD 14.1.1987-31.7.1992 (1)
























































































































(1) GMM estimates; the numbers in parenthesis are Student’s t.
(2) For the Italian lira, the Spanish peseta and the British pound,
the second line reports the results respectively for the
following periods: 8.1.1990-31.7.1992; 9.6.1989-31.7.1992 and
8.1.1990-31.7.1992.Table A8
RESULTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE REGRESSION OF BILATERAL
EXCHANGE RATES VIS-À-VIS THE DM ON THE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE
OF THE DOLLAR FOR THE PERIOD 11.1.1992-23.11.1996 (1)
























































































(1) GMM estimates; the numbers in parenthesis are Student’s t.Table A9
RESULTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE REGRESSION OF NOMINAL
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES OF VARIOUS CURRENCIES ON THAT OF THE
DOLLAR FOR THE PERIOD 1.6.1973-11.3.1979 (1)
























































































(1) GMM estimates; the numbers in parenthesis are Student’s t.Table A10
RESULTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE REGRESSION OF NOMINAL
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES OF VARIOUS CURRENCIES ON THAT OF THE
DOLLAR FOR THE PERIOD 12.3.1979-13.1.1987 (1)
























































































(1) GMM estimates; the numbers in parenthesis are Student’s t.Table A11
RESULTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE REGRESSION OF NOMINAL
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES OF VARIOUS CURRENCIES ON THAT OF
THE DOLLAR FOR THE PERIOD 14.1.1987-31.7.1992 (1)

























































































































(1) GMM estimates; the numbers in parenthesis are Student’s t.
(2) For the Italian lira, the Spanish peseta and the British pound,
the second line reports the results respectively for the
following periods: 8.1.1990-31.7.1992; 9.6.1989-31.7.1992 and
8.1.1990-31.7.1992.Table A12
RESULTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE REGRESSION OF NOMINAL
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES OF VARIOUS CURRENCIES ON THAT OF THE
DOLLAR FOR THE PERIOD 1.11.1992-23.11.1996 (1)
























































































(1) GMM estimates; the numbers in parenthesis are Student’s t.References
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